Megaprojects fail due to power dynamics and biased planning

A plan arrives at a meeting filled with figures, schedules and arrows. It looks neutral. Then power enters the room. Bent Flyvbjerg asks what happens when supposedly technical decisions become shaped by interests, conflicts and actors with unequal capacities. His answer challenges rationalist models of planning. For him, governance is not only about selecting the most efficient option on paper. It also matters who defines the problem, which interests prevail and which risks become minimized. The central question is uncomfortable. What happens when technical language hides relations of power? His studies of planning and megaprojects carry that question from abstract theory into concrete decisions.

The role of power in planning decisions

The mechanism becomes clear through his phronetic social science, an approach that studies concrete decisions through values, power and consequences. Flyvbjerg shifts attention from abstract models toward situations where different actors try to shape a decision. First, we observe what is at stake. Then we identify who has the capacity to influence the process. Next, we examine which arguments gain authority and which become marginalized. Finally, we ask who gains and who loses from the outcome. This does not turn every technical decision into a conspiracy. It shows that rationality operates inside social relationships. A calculation may be correct while still entering an arena where different interests compete. Planning therefore appears as both a technical and political practice.

His research on Aalborg provides a first case for thinking through this mechanism. Flyvbjerg studies planning by observing conflicts, interests and power relations within a concrete situation. The value of the case does not come from turning Aalborg into a universal recipe. It allows us to follow how decisions are constructed while different actors attempt to influence them. This can be read as an advantage of the phronetic approach. Instead of assuming that the strongest technical argument will eventually prevail, it asks what actually happens during the process. A final decision can contain expert knowledge while also reflecting unequal political capacities. The plan then stops looking like a purely rational conclusion. It becomes a provisional outcome produced through competing forces.

How underestimated risks affect megaprojects

Now imagine a major transport project. The scenario is hypothetical, but it uses the mechanisms described by Flyvbjerg. A team presents costs, benefits, schedules and risks. On paper, everything appears measurable. Yet some actors need the project to advance and may have greater capacity to defend it. If risks become underestimated, the appearance of precision can become misleading. The problem starts before construction. It appears when a technical decision incorporates bias or leaves uncertainty outside the main picture. Flyvbjerg’s research on megaprojects highlights precisely the importance of underestimated risks. Risk is not merely a figure. It also depends on how an organization chooses to recognize, communicate and use uncertainty during decision making.

A third case can begin with two technical alternatives. Both contain different benefits, costs and uncertainties. A rationalist model might suggest that comparison will identify one superior option. Now suppose a strong actor helps define which criteria matter most. The outcome can appear technical even though the comparison already contains a power relationship. This does not prove that every decision is manipulated. It shows why Flyvbjerg studies conflicts and interests inside governance. The effects come later. One alternative advances, another disappears and selected risks shape the future decision. Understanding the outcome requires reconstructing the process first. The question is no longer only which option looked better. We must also ask who had the capacity to define what better meant.

There is a strong counterargument. Planning needs rational models, expert knowledge and risk analysis. Without them, major decisions could depend even more heavily on private interests or weak intuition. This objection deserves serious attention. Technical calculation can provide essential information. The problem appears when we assume calculation operates outside power. This can be read as the main contribution of the phronetic approach. It does not require abandoning technical analysis. It requires examining how technical analysis is used inside concrete situations. A model can inform a decision without fully determining it. It can also acquire authority selectively. Studying governance therefore means examining both analytical tools and the relationships among those who can mobilize them most effectively.

The supplied material shows three connected elements. Flyvbjerg studies concrete cases, power relations and megaprojects where bias and underestimated risks shap