Platform Economy and Urban Work: Precarity and Regulation

The platform economy has transformed urban work by turning drivers, couriers, cleaners and carers into self-employed workers managed by apps that assign tasks, set prices and rate performance, and cities are the stage of that transformation because density makes on-demand services profitable. The International Labour Organization counted more than 777 digital labour platforms worldwide in 2021, and in the European Union some 28 million people work through them. Two authors have set the terms of the debate: Nick Srnicek, who in Platform Capitalism (2017) described the economic model, and Robin Chase, co-founder of Zipcar, who in Peers Inc (2015) defended its potential to make use of underused assets.

Nick Srnicek: precarity by design and algorithmic control

Srnicek explains why platform work is precarious by design. Companies do not own the cars, bikes or tools but the digital infrastructure that connects supply and demand and the data each transaction generates, and their profitability depends on externalising to workers the capital, maintenance, insurance and the risk of having no customers. Control is exercised by the algorithm: order allocation, variable rates, user ratings and deactivations without appeal replace the boss without providing the rights the boss implied. The flexibility advertised is, in his analysis, the transfer of business risk to the worker.

Robin Chase: underused assets and flexibility with protection

Chase represents the optimistic view. In Peers Inc she argues that platforms unlock value from underused assets, the parked car, the empty room, spare time, and allow people without traditional jobs to earn income on schedules they choose. Her experience at Zipcar leads her to advocate collaboration between platforms and governments to keep flexibility and add protection: portable benefits, social security contributions and minimum standards. She acknowledges, however, that in cities with a high cost of living income instability deepens inequality, and that most people working through platforms do so out of need rather than choice.

Rider law, Uber in the UK and the EU directive: regulation arrives

The data support caution. Studies by the ILO and the European Commission show that many platform workers earn below the minimum wage once expenses are deducted, lack accident and sickness cover, and that the concentration of couriers and drivers in city centres increases congestion and crashes. Cities have responded: Spain's rider law of 2021 presumed couriers to be employees after a Supreme Court ruling; the UK Supreme Court recognised Uber drivers as workers in 2021; New York set a minimum pay rate for delivery workers in 2023; and the European directive on platform work of 2024 establishes a presumption of employment and algorithmic transparency.

Proposition 22, cooperatives and public platforms: the responses

The platforms' response has swung between litigation and adaptation. In California they funded Proposition 22 in 2020 to keep drivers as contractors; in Spain, Deliveroo left the market and Glovo kept its freelance model until 2024. At the same time, delivery cooperatives such as CoopCycle and Mensakas have emerged, and couriers' unions in London, Buenos Aires or Jakarta negotiate rates and safety. Srnicek proposes going further: public or cooperative platforms that treat data and intermediation as urban infrastructure rather than private business.

The lesson for cities is that platform work is not a technological phenomenon but a regulatory decision. The same app can sustain decent employment or precarity depending on who holds the data, who bears the risk and which rights the law guarantees, and cities, where that work happens, have instruments, licences, local minimum rates, public space and support for cooperatives, to decide it. Between Srnicek's pessimism and Chase's optimism, the evidence indicates that flexibility only benefits the worker when it comes with protection.